about what appears to be the case, without giving up one's suspensive attitude as to what really is the case. The latter doctrine states that one can live 'naturally', without having to make any judgments, by obeying one's natural compulsions unconsciously, or by habit, and by accepting, without judging their worth, the customs and regulations of one's social and cultural environment.9
In various parts of Hume's philosophical writings, he indicated that he believed that a portion of the Pyrrhonian doctrine was the logical outcome of philosophical analysis. An examination of the grounds for our judgments concerning matters of fact, matters of value, or even mathematical matters, reveals, according to Hume, that the basis for any of these judgments is neither rational nor certain, and that no judgment can be considered more firmly based than another. ' The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another '.10 Not only is this the case, but in addition, any attempt to overcome this basic defect in our knowledge only exposes more fundamental and insurmountable difficulties. ' This sceptical doubt, both with respect to reason and the senses, is a malady, which can never be radically cur'd, but must return upon us every moment, however we may chace it away, and sometimes may seem entirely free from it. 'Tis impossible upon any system to defend either our understanding or senses; and we but expose them farther when we endeavour to justify them in that manner '.11 A close examination of Hume's views will show that he agreed with the Pyrrhonian theory of the inability to find any rational and certain basis for our judgments to the extent that an epistemological analysis of the nature and grounds of human knowledge would reveal that there are no rational or certain grounds for our judgments, and that we have no ultimate criterion for determining which of our conflicting judgments in certain fundamental areas of human knowledge are true, or to be preferred.12
In the discussion of Pyrrhonism in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume distinguished two types of sceptical arguments that the Pyrrhonians present, a popular type which is trivial and weak, and a philosophical type which is irrefutable. The former consists of arguments about the fallaciousness or contradictoriness of sense information, the natural weaknesses of the human understanding, the long and tedious history of disagreeTr.ent amro:ng r.ern on almost eve:ry conceivable subject, the vari9Sextus Empiricus, ibid, Sections 13-24. 1Treatise, pp. 268-9. "Ibid, p. 218. 12It is interesting to note that in one of the most Pyrrhonian passages in Hume's writings, the conclusion to Book I of the Treatise, Hume applies this sceptical view to his own theories and asked, 'Can I be sure, that in leaving all establish'd opinions I am following truth; and by what criterion shall I distinguish her, even if fortune shou'd at last guide me on her foot-steps ? After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings, I can give no reason why I shou'd assent to it; and feel nothing but a strong propensity to consider objects strongly 'i. that view, under which they appear to m.e '. Ibid., p. 265. ability of our judgments depending on internal and external circumstances, etc., or, in brief, the main sort of arguments propounded in the ten tropes of Pyrrhonism as found in Sextus. These arguments are weak and trivial, first of all, because, according to Hume, the difficulties involved in sense information only prove that the senses alone cannot be completely depended upon, and must be corrected by other sources of information, such as memory or reason. This, then, would not show that all our knowledge is unreliable owing to our faulty senses, but only that the senses, considered alone, are insufficient to yield a satisfactory basis for judgments.l3 Secondly, these popular arguments are weak and trivial because they assume that the value of the type of judgments they are directed against depends upon their certitude. Hume believed that these popular arguments were directed against the sort of judgments made in everyday common life. Then, these arguments show that there are grounds for doubting the certitude of such judgments, but the judgments themselves have a pragmatic r61e in our ordinary endeavours which is unaffected by these doubts. On the common sense level, Hume contended, it is both necessary, at all times, to make judgments without reference to the grounds or evidence on which they were based, and to evaluate the judgments without such reference. The epistemological objections raised by the Pyrrhonist are beside the point.l4
The philosophical types of argument show that, at bottom, there is no rational or certain basis for either our factual and moral judgments, or the rational (mathematical) judgments that we make. This type of argument shows the most fundamental strength of Pyrrhonism, namely that our rational and factual judgments sometimes conflict, and that there is no basis whatever for choosing one judgment in preference to another. Such a line of reasoning, culminating in so radical a conclusion, Hume contended was irrefutable, and, on the epistemological level of analysis, completely devastating to any and every attempt to discover certain knowledge. The evidence adduced by Hume in support of these Pyrrhonian conclusions is first of all the result of his analysis of those factual judgments which are more than mere reports of immediate appearances. All our evidence for any matter of fact which is not obvious at a given moment is based on the relation of cause and effect or constant conjunction. There is no rational basis for believing that those objects that have constantly been conjoined in the past, will still be so conjoined in the future. It is only custom, or 'a certain instinct of our nature ' that makes us believe that they will be so conjoined, and this instinct which may be hard to resist psychologically, may well be fallacious and deceitful.15 The basis for all factual and probable 13Enquiry, p. 124. 14 'These objections are but weak. For as, in common life, we reason every moment concerning fact and existence, and cannot possibly subsist, without continually employing this species of argument, any popular objections, derived from thence, must be insufficient to destroy that evidence '. Ibid., p. 130, reasoning is thus irrational, determined by certain natural instinctive forces resulting in certain emotional effects.16
In the case of value judgments, similar psychological factors are even more in evidence, showing that these judgments too, are not based on rational evidence. Here Hume maintained that moral, or value distinctions can be known to us neither by the comparison of ideas by reason, nor by an examination of matters of fact.l7 Reason cannot be the source because (a) moral ideas influence our passions, whereas rational ones do not, and (b) reason compares ideas seeking truth or falsity in terms of their agreement or disagreement, whereas, in the case of moral ideas we cannot meaningfully look for truth or falsity, but instead seek for what is laudable and blameable. Matters of fact can have nothing to do with moral distinctions since they are not features of any object. Our knowledge of moral distinctions is based entirely upon some sentiments within us due to our moral sense. 'Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judg'd of '18 These two arguments concerning matters of fact and moral distinctions constitute the most elementary Pyrrhonian level, showing that in two main areas of enquiry, our opinions are based on non-rational factors. The more radical and perplexing levels of Pyrrhonism are, for Hume, those that introduce a doubt regarding the rationality of our reasonings, and their compatibility with our obvious information derived from the senses and common life.
In the beginning of Book I, Part III of the Treatise, Hume had drawn a distinction between knowledge and probability, and had maintained that perfect demonstrative knowledge regarding quantity or number was possible, and could be obtained through chains of reasoning about certain types of relations between ideas. Such a contention would seem to be at variance with the Pyrrhonian view, since, at least in regard to the science of arithmetic, certain and rational knowledge would appear to be attainable. The sceptical view, enunciated in both the second book of Sextus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism and in Montaigne's Apology for Raimond Sebond, to the effect 16 'Thus all probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation. 'Tis not solely in poetry and music, we must follow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy. When I am convinc'd of any principle, 'tis only an idea, which strikes more strongly upon me. When I give the preference to one set of arguments above another, I do nothing but decide from my feeling concerning the superiority of their influence. Objects have no discoverable connexion together; nor is it from any other principle but custom operating upon the imagination, that we can draw any inference from the appearance of one to the existence of another .' Treatise, p. 103. 1For Hume's discussion of this point, see Treatise, Book III, Part I. 18Treatise, p. 470. The clearest statement of Hume's view is: 'Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Willful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact, but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling of sentime:nt of blame :rom the contemplation of it '. Ibid, pp. 468-9. that no true proof could ever be given of anything, is apparently denied by Hume at this point. However, in Book I, Part IV of the Treatise Hume presented some rather novel arguments to show that one must adopt a 'scepticism with regard to reason '.
The first of these arguments attempts to show that we can never have any reason for believing that a given chain of reasoning is logically correct, even though, if it were correct, it would constitute a legitimate proof. Thus, the argument tries to establish that there can never be adequate rational evidence for a judgment of the type 'I know that P is legitimate proof'. Such an argument is to be distinguished from the usual Pyrrhonian contention about proofs, to the effect that one must suspend judgment as to the truth of a judgment of the type 'P is a legitimate proof '. Hume raised doubts as to the ability of any human being ever to be sure that he could recognize a legitimate proof, but he did not doubt the possibility of there being legitimate proofs. However, the result of the Pyrrhonian and Humean argument is the same, to show us that we must suspend judgment with regard to the claim that any proposition has been proven.
Hume's argument on this matter is as follows: Everyone knows from experience that his ability to carry out a chain of reasoning is not perfect. Therefore, in judging the accuracy of any piece of reasoning, the reasoner will have to take into account the probability that he has reasoned accurately in this case. This probability will be less than 1, and thus, the judgment, 'I know that P is a lcgitimate proof' can only be probable, but never completely true. Further, our ability to judge when we have accurately reasoned is not perfect, and hence there is a further probability, namely whether we have judged properly in evaluating our reasoning. Hume contends that the probability of the new judgment was the product of the probability that we reasoned properly and that we judged the accuracy of our reasoning properly. Since both probabilities are less than 1, the product is smaller than either of them. Then, there is a further question as to whether or not we have properly evaluated our ability to judge our judgments about the accuracy of our reasoning properly. Since both probabilities are less than 1, the product is smaller than either of them. Then, there is a further question as to whether or not we have properly evaluated our ability to judge our judgments about the accuracy of our reasonings, etc. This process of introducing new probabilities, each less than the preceding ones, can go on ad infinitum, and thus, the probability that we could ever recognize, without the slightest shadow of doubt, that a particular piece of reasoning was correct, approached zero.19
This argument may not lead to Pyrrhonian doubts about logical rules and inferences, but it does raise some doubts as to the ability of any human being ever to be positive that he is reasoning logically. If one depended upon complete assurance that one's ability to reason was perfect before accepting any proof whatsoever, then, Hume, claimed, this argument introducing probability considerations into our judgments about our reasonings would 'utterly subvert all belief and opinion'. 'But as experience will sufficiently convince any one, who thinks it worth while to try, that tho' he can find no error in the foregoing arguments, yet he still continues to believe, think, and reason as usual, he may safely conclude, that his reasoning and belief is some sensation or peculiar manner of conception, which 'tis impossible for mere ideas and reflections to destroy '. 20 Hume then offered a psychological theory explaining why these arguments bring about no dimunition of our faith in our reasonings, suggesting that this is due to the fact that the mind cannot ' stretch ' itself into the uncomfortable position from which to make judgments about its judgments.21 Thus, what preserves our faith in our reasonings is not rational evidence, but only some psychological quirks of our constitution, and hence the Pyrrhonian contention that we have no rational basis for defending our opinion is once again illustrated.
In order to undermine further our confidence in our reasonings, and to show yet more forcefully that the Pyrrhonian position is irrefutable, Hume presented the contradictions which arise between 'proper' reasonings on the one hand and sense-information and common-sense beliefs on the other. These contradictions concern the existence of external objects, the status of primary qualities, the nature of the 'self' and the conclusions of arithmetic and geometry. The first arises because we all naturally believe that the objects we perceive with our senses are real objects, in that they are distinct from the observer, and exist continuously whether observed or not, and yet, at the same time, our rational enquiries force us to conclude that all our perceptions exist in us, and cannot exist apart from us. Hume maintained, in both the Treatise and Enquiry, that men were led by a natural instinct to suppose that there is an external universe existing independently and continuously, and that our sense images belong to this universe.22 'But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy .23 All that we ever perceive are sense images. The Pyrrhonian evidence is overwhelmingly in support of the view that these images are dependent upon us, in that the images can be altered by our state. We do not believe that when we affect the image, e.g. by pressing one eyeball, the object is similarly changed. The images can be no more than a feature of our mental world. Hence, the philosophers have invented their dualistic solution, that the images are different from the objects. But this system is no aid, since all we ever can know are images, and hence it can never offer any rational evidence in support of the dualistic view.24 The crux of the problem is that our instinctive realistic beliefs conflict with our rational views on the subject, and yet no rational solution can be given to overcome the difficulty. Both our common-sensical and our rational views are determined by 'trivial qualities of the mind', and so we seem to be led The second of these contradictions is due to a conflict between the contentions that secondary qualities are nothing but impressions in the mind, and that there is an external material world. Hume first agreed that the same reasoning (mainly Pyrrhonian arguments about illusion and the concomitant variability of our state and our perceptions) that led one to deny the extra-mental existence of secondary qualities compelled one to deny the extra-mental existence of primary qualities. Here he employed some of Berkeley's arguments to show that there was no epistemological basis or distinguishing the type of qualities that include motion and extension rom the type that include colour and sound. In addition Hume tried to show that our knowledge of primary qualities was actually knowledge of certain arrangements of secondary qualities. The conclusion to be drawn from these points is, then, that all of the qualities of bodies are impressions of the mind, and that there is nothing meaningful that we can call an external material object.26 Thus, if we believe the theory of secondary qualities, ' we utterly annihilate all these [external] objects, and reduce ourselves to the opinions of the most extravagant scepticism concerning them. If colours, sounds, tastes, and smells be merely perceptions, nothing we can conceive is possest of real, continu'd, and independent existence . . . '.27 Therefore, once again the natural belief in an external world turns out to be contrary to our rational principles, and the latter seem to be indefensible. The only conclusion Hume could come to from such conflicting views was:
'Thus there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses; or more properly speaking, betwixt those conclusions we form from cause and effect, and those that persuade us of the continu'd and independent existence of body '28 Another contradiction is to be found in the analysis of personal identity. Hume's discussion of this subject led him to conclude that we have no impression and, hence, no idea of a 'self', and that all we can mean by the term is a succession of some particular perceptions. What makes us believe that these perceptions are bound together by some connection which gives them an identity and simplicity is a strong feeling we have when viewing the perceptions. No real connections are ever discoverable by human beings. In the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume announced that the 25' This is a topic, therefore, in which the profounder and more philosophical sceptics will always triumph, when they endeavour to introduce an universal doubt into all subjects of human knowledge and enquiry. Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense ? But these lead you to believe, that the very perception or sensible image is the external object. Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the percep tions are only representations of something external ? You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove, that the perceptions are connected with any external objects'. Enquiry, p. 126. 26Treatise, pp. 225-31, and Enquiry, pp. 126-7. 27Treatise, p. 228. In the Enquiry, Hume stated, ' Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a manner annihilate it, and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something, as the cause of our perceptions; a notion so imperfect, that no sceptic will think it worth while to contend against it '. Enquiry, p. 127. 28Treatise, p. 231.
above conclusions contained a labyrinth of contradictions and absurdities, which he was unable to render consistent. The difficulties here do not seem to be due to logical contradictions, but to violations of common sense beliefs. The whole discussion in this Appendix note points out that Hume's analysis leads to a view that there is no real unity discoverable amongst our perceptions, and yet a unifying connective principle is needed to make this square with common sense opinion about the nature of the self. Since Hume was unable to make his theory about the ' self' agree with ordinary views on this matter, all that he could do was to announce that he was a sceptic on this issue, and the difficulties on this head were sufficient to make anybody a complete sceptic.29
The final contradictions are the result of rational mathematical conclusions, some of which are ' big with contradiction and absurdity '.30 Hume felt that the mathematical demonstrations about the infinite divisibility of extensions and time, though as logically sound as any other mathematical proof, and though based ultimately on the same premises, were paradoxical in that they conflicted with our common sense notions. The conception of the angle of contact between the circumference of a circle and its tangent which is proved to be infinitely smaller than any acute angle is at variance with our ordinary notions, etc.31 Some of the mathematical proofs lead to such ' absurd' results from the point of view of common sense (and, fortunately, Hume lived too early to know about the even stranger theorems of modern set theory with its hierarchy of infinities) that 'Reason here seems to be thrown into a kind of amazement and suspence, which, without the suggestions of any sceptic, gives her a diffidence of herself, and of the ground on which she treads. She sees a full light, which illuminates certain places; but that light borders upon the most profound darkness. And between these she is so dazzled and confounded, that she scarcely can pronounce with certainty and assurance concerning any one object '.32 All these many arguments show, according to Hume, that the extreme scepticism of the Pyrrhonians cannot be refuted, and that it is the logical result of an epistemological analysis of the bases of our beliefs in factual, moral, and demonstrative matters. In all these beliefs we find that our views are determined by non-rational factors, and in general that it would be impossible to offer any satisfactory rational evidence for our opinions. In addition to this, our opinions derived from reason conflict with our senses, or common-sense beliefs. We have no criterion whatsoever for preferring one belief to another.
In the conclusion to Book I of the Treatise, Hume revealed despairingly that this epistemological Pyrrhonism was all that philosophy could lead us to. All that we could ever know by memory, senses, or understanding, is founded on the irrational psychological quirks of the imagination. Even the acceptance of Humean philosophy could only be advocated on the grounds The epistemological analysis of human knowledge leads to a complete Pyrrhonian scepticism. Yet Hume held, as we have seen, that this analysis fails when applied to common sense beliefs, and fails to undermine our convictions in them, since they are not really rational beliefs. The Scottish sceptic went much further in his judgment of the merits of this extreme sceptical view, holding that no one could ever believe it, regardless of the fact that it was philosophically unanswerable. In common life, the Pyrrhonian doubts are ignored.36 On the philosophical level, this scepticism is just not believed. 'Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this total scepticism, has really disputed without an antagonist '37 Let us now turn to this other side of Hume's views about Pyrrhonism. On the one hand, Pyrrhonism cannot be refuted, and yet nobody ever did or can believe the view. The explanation of this rather paradoxical observation that sceptical arguments ' admit of no answer and produce no conviction ' The Pyrrhonist, according to Hume, maintains that the suspensive attitude ought to result from and does result from showing that in no area whatsoever have we the slightest rational basis for holding to an opinion. Hume agreed that this does happen with regard to speculative reasoning.
Here, the sceptic's discovery that we have no rational basis for our views undermines our belief in them, and leaves us suspending judgment.40
The sceptic has the strange opinion, also common to the Stoic, that what a man can do sometimes, and in some conditions, he can do at all times and in all conditions.41 However, this is definitely not the case. The same sort of natural factors by which our biological existence is shaped, determine our psychological existence as well, and require us to hold to opinions sometimes regardless of evidence.
' Shou'd it here be ask'd me, whether I sincerely assent to this argument, which I seem to take such pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of those sceptics, who hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in any thing possest of any measures of truth and falsehood; I shou'd reply, that this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression, then we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards then in broad sunshine '.42 Therefore, the sceptical view that we ought not and do not hold any opinions is false. We must hold opinions since nature forces us to. It is not really a question of what we should do, but rather a question of what we have to do.
We are required to judge about (i) factual, (ii) moral, and (iii) rational matters, regardless of the legitimate evidence that we have at our disposal. (i) As Hume explained at great length, our belief in judgment about matters of fact is not due to rational evidence, but is the result of a custom or habit, which produces a strong feeling in us regarding certain ideas usually conjoined with an impression now present to the senses or memory. The judgments that we believe concerning such matters impose themselves upon us because of our mental constitution.
Thus, it is nature and not logical reasoning that leads us to make all causal inferences. It is this type of inference which 'peoples the world ' and allows us to talk of matters not immediately present to sense or memory.
(ii) With regard to moral judgments, Hume's entire thesis is to the effect that they are the result of a moral sense which when operating normally leads us to have certain feelings with regard to various objects and events. We evaluate naturally and not by reflective analysis. An opinion that something is good, or meritorious, is the result of a pleasant feeling, and an 40 ' But it is evident, when our arguments . . . run wide of common life, that the most refined scepticism comes to be upon a footing with them, and is able to oppose and counterbalance them. The one has no more weight than the other. The mind must remain in suspense between them; and it is that very suspense or balance which is the triumph of scepticism '. Dialogues, pp. 135-6. found of some importance ', namely that a proposition involving ought does not follow from one involving is. Thus, presumably, Hume realised that evidence proving reason to be the slave of the passions does not establish that reason ought to be the slave of the passions. Thus, I think that the context of the passage in question and the observation on inferring a normative proposition from a factual one suggest that Hume's meaning was not that he advocated a positive theory of moral irrationalism, but rather that he denied a positive theory of moral rationalism. His strong way of stating the denial makes it look as if he meant more. But all that he offered as evidence was a series of psychological considerations to show that reason does not direct our actions, and that reason is the slave of the passions. Hence, it does not seem to be unreasonable that that was all that he meant to say. And if this was all that he meant to say, then the passage does not deny that Hume was a complete Pyrrhonist on philosophical matters, but rather serves as one more indication of the point.
(iii) The sceptical arguments indicating that we can never acquire certain demonstrative knowledge likewise conflict with what nature compels us to believe. Hume felt that his argument that we are never able to be sure that any demonstrative reasoning is correct was unanswerable, and yet, it does not prevent people from being sure on this head. Our assurance is, however, not rationally grounded, but is due to natural factors. The mind is unable to carry doubt of its ability to judge its judgments ad infinitum because this puts the mind in an uneasy posture, 'the spirits being diverted from their natural course .46 And this very inability is what saves us from the force of the sceptical argument. We reason by nature, and, by a very fortunate quirk of the mind, we are unaffected by doubts cast on our reasoning abilities.
Nature not only compels all men, including the sceptic, to reason and believe concerning factual, moral, and demonstrative matters, though there is no rational defence of doing so, but nature also compels us to believe in the existence of certain types of metaphysical objects, though there is no proof that they exist, and though a belief in their existence leads to paradoxes. Hume seemed to be of the opinion that nature led us to believe in the existence of body, mind, and God, Descartes's three substances, though by no arguments of philosophical reasoning could these beliefs be defended.
The problem of the existence of bodies is prefaced by the remark that 'he [the sceptic] must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, tho' he cannot pretend by any. argument of philosophy to maintain its veracity. Nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless esteem'd it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body ? but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not ? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings '.47 In the Enquiry Hume said that the belief in the existence of an external world was due to following 'the instincts and propensities of nature ' But, as has been pointed out above, Hume contended that this belief was not only indefensible, but at variance with our best reasonings on the subject. Nature, by an odd type of propensity leads us to believe that the objects which we perceive exist continuously, though not always perceived. We naturally tend to consider our interrupted preceptions as continuous, and even though this may be in conflict with our reasonings. Even after Hume pointed out that our natural belief in the existence of body was in complete conflict with our reasonings, that there was no way he could discover to reconcile the conflict, and that this led to the most profound sceptical doubts, he still insisted that 'whatever may be the reader's opinion at this present moment [after reading Hume], an hour hence he will be persuaded there is both an external and internal world '.49 The natural propensity to believe in the existence of bodies was too strong to be overcome by even the most insurmountable metaphysical difficulties.
The case with regard to the natural belief in the existence of mind, or self, is harder to make out, but I believe it is the only interpretation which can account for Hume's apparently strange reversal on the question of personal identity in the Appendix to the Treatise. The discussion of personal identity is not intended, as often supposed, just to show that we have no impression of a continuing 'self'. Almost all of Hume's analysis on this point is concerned with the development of an answer to the question, ' What then gives us so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro' the whole course of our lives ? '60
The belief in personal identity is a natural one, in that everyone holds to it without or prior to any reflection on the subject.51 But it is also a belief without any basis in Hume's epistemological analysis. The clear indication of this fact makes it look as if Hume denied that anyone ever actually had a belief that the 'self' existed. However, Hume showed, on his psychological principles, how such a 'fictitious' belief occurs, which amounts to showing the natural causes of such a belief. In his discussion in the Appendix, Hume said that his account of personal identity was contradictory. He stated that he was unable to reconcile two of his principles that he employed in this account: that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. Now, as Kemp Smith pointed out, these two principles do not conflict, but the second happens to be a corollary of the first. No logical difficulty whatever in Hume's doctrine is pointed out in the Appendix.52 So that any contradiction that Hume found is of a different variety entirely. One interpretation, which renders intelligible Hume's assertion that his doctrine is contradictory, is that his analysis seems to lead to a denial of the natural Although Hume was certainly a consistent anti-religionist, he did contend that the belief in the existence of a deity was natural. A statement like this must be carefully qualified to avoid any suggestion that Hume believed in the Deity of the Judeo-Christian tradition, or in any sort of personal God. What he himself believed in is quite difficult to determine, especially since, as Kemp Smith pointed out,55 Hume became less and less theistically inclined as time went on, and more and more antagonistic to all religious views. Also, Hume made several remarks in his writings, which taken out of their context would indicate a much stronger religious attitude on his part, than his works, and especially the Dialogues, could possibly support.
In The Natural History of Religion, Hume attempted to present some of the causal factors which induce men to believe in a deity. Here he differentiates between two types of beliefs, the superstitious ones which the common man is led to adopt by natural causes, and the more 'rational' ones that thinking men are made to accept by other natural factors. The common man in ancient days was polytheistically inclined because of all the amazing and apparently irregular occurrences in the world. The common man would be completely baffled by the world he meets, resulting from causes that he cannot know, 'were it not for a propensity in human nature '.5 This propensity is the universal tendency to anthropomorphize nature, and conceive of natural forces and events as endowed with human capacities. Popular religion develops from this anthromorphic polytheism to a more theistic view, not by reasoning, but by a gradual exaggeration of one of the deities whom human beings think they most depend upon, until this conception becomes that of a completed unified and infinite deity who created the world.57 This conception which grows naturally just happens to coincide 'by chance, with the principles of reason and true philosophy .58 Hume felt that popular religion, besides being in conflict with our rational notions, led to the excesses of' enthusiasm ' and superstition. True religion, or more properly, the religion of the learned, arises from different natural principles. It arises from a recognition of the order in the universe. ' The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion '.s9 Although Hume was, perhaps, the most severe and devastating critic of the argument from design who ever wrote on theological questions, he yet maintained that the order obvious in the world compelled any rational man to admit that one could infer from the order to the existence of some guiding intelligence, which, for want of a better term, may be called God.60 Order naturally leads a rational man to believe in an intelligent source of the order.
Thus, according to Hume there is a 'universal propensity to believe in invisible, intelligent power .61 This may be due to an original instinct or a general feature of human nature. The vulgar believe because of their fears, and their anthropomorphizing tendencies; the intelligent because of the order in the world. (Of course, it must be recalled that Hume regarded the vulgar religion and the usual dogmatic theologies as utter absurdities and perversions, insisting that no positive attributes of God or moral commands of God could ever be discovered, and hence, one should accept only theological views that are forced upon us, and not any superstitions or absurdities added to them. Nature does not allow us to be atheists, but does not force us to assent to the vagaries of popular superstition or refined theology).62
Not only does nature require us to make judgments on all these matters, though we lack adequate evidence for these judgments, but, also, some of us are required to philosophize. The sceptic may realize that no speculative questions can ever be settled, but this does not mean that he can avoid reasoning and even holding opinions about them. The pleasures and satisfactions of philosophizing, regardless of the merits of the enterprise, are often sufficient to entice even the sceptic, and make him enter into so futile 69Ibid., p. 309. This same view is expressed several times in the Natural History. Cf. pp. 313, 315, 325, 328-9 and 361. 60Philo in the last of the Dialogues maintained that one could not suspend judgment on the existence of such a guiding cause. ' That the works of nature bear a great analogy to the production of art is evident; and according to the rules of good reasoning, we ought to infer, if we argue at all concerning them, that their causes have a proportional analogy '. Dialogues pp. 216-7. Later on Philo stated the one proposition left to natural theology, 'that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence'. Ibid., p. 227. Or, lastly, there is the stronger statement in the Natural History, 'A purpose, an intention, a design is evident in everything; and when our comprehension is so far enlarged as to contemplate the first rise of this visible system, we must adopt, with the strongest conviction, the idea of some intelligent cause or author ' (p. 361 Hume apparently believed that nature did all these amazing things to us in order to protect us, and allow us to live in this world. Our reasoning faculties are so weak and fallacious, as all the philosophers from Montaigne and Descartes to Locke and Bayle had pointed out, that had we been forced to depend upon them to determine what we must believe in order to survive in this world, we would have perished long ago. These beliefs which we are compelled to accept are 'of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations .64 It is so essential to human existence that we make judgments and inferences that nature has made these instinctive, just as the use of our limbs is.65 And this leads to the last, and perhaps, principal reason why Pyrrhonism is incredible : it is incompatible, according to Hume, with the actions necessary to support human life.
. . . he [the Pyrrhonist] must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge any thing, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence '.66 The natural safeguards which enable us to live are at variance with the proposed suspensive attitude of the Pyrrhonians, and hence, nature being stronger than Pyrrhonism, the necessary actions which we must perform to live destroy all possibility of being Pyrrhonian.
Hume maintained that, in order to exist in this world, to act as human beings do, one must hold to some opinions. Our actions are not based upon a rational philosophy, but on irrational natural instincts and mechanisms which allow us to persevere. This is true of all men, including the Pyrrhonian sceptics.67 What we believe, in order to act, is not a matter of rational choice, and did we not believe these matters we would perish. The Pyrrhonian sceptic would, if he were sincere, have no basis for doing one thing rather than another, for drinking water rather than vinegar, or for employing doors rather than windows as means of exiting.68 But the conduct of the Pyrrhonian shows that in practical matters he has ' the firmest reliance on all the received maxims of science, morals, prudence, and behaviour'.69 Though he may suspend judgment on the validity of any such maxims, in practice he accepts them all the time. No matter how much the extreme sceptic undermines the reasons for what we do, he will never prevent us from doing it. 'Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever '.70 Thus, Pyrrhonian scepticism, if believed and acted upon, could only have the unfortunate result of destroying the believer. As long as the doctrine leads to a suspense of all action it can have no other result and no adherent. If the sceptic is really sincere, Hume maintained, he will soon cease bothering anyone. This doctrine is unique in that it is the only one with no alleged useful or beneficial end. If believed, the believer does nothing. Other doctrines propose to tell people what the world is like, or how to live better; this one tells us nothing, and leaves the believer to perish.71
What philosophical merits does this 'naturalistic' criticism of Pyrrhonism have ? The criticism is not intended to, nor does it, show that the Pyrrhonian theory which Hume accepted has any logical difficulties.72 The main force of the criticism is psychological and practical, and amounts to an explanation of what we do, if it is actually the case that Pyrrhonism SIbid., p. 132. This is the old objection of Epictetus. 69Ibid., p. 137. 70Enquiry, p. 36. Pyrrhonism may be believed in the sceptic's school or closet, but in the everyday world our natural instincts drive it away. 'These principles [Pyrrhonism] may flourish and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in the same condition as other mortals'.
Ibid., p. 130. 'And though a PYRRHONIAN may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised against them'. Ibid., pp. 131-2. See also, Dialogues, pp. 132-3, and Treatise, Conclusion to Book I, and p. 455.
7lIbid., p. 131. 72Hume did not believe the usual logical refutation of Pyrrhonian, namely, that if the sceptical arguments were strong, they showed that something could be known, and if weak, not in need of refutation. Hume maintained that the sceptical reasonings were always as strong as those to which they were opposed, in that any dogmatic conclusion allowed for a sceptical answer. An unanswerable question can be asked on the basis of whatever dogmatic maxims are used. If the dogmatic maxims are disavowed because of the sceptical arguments, then both the sceptical and dogmatic conclusions are invalidated, and not just the former. See Treatise, pp. 186-7. is unanswerable. The reasons why people believe or do not believe a given doctrine are not necessarily comments on its truth or falsity. If people do not believe Pyrrhonism, as Hume portrayed it, because of certain natural attitudes that they have, this is no philosophical reflection on Pyrrhonism.
However, pointing out the incredibility of a doctrine, and the unfortunate consequences of believing it, has often sufficed, historically, for leading people to give up a doctrine. E.g. consider Hume's criticism of popular religion, or Voltaire's of optimism. Neither of these proves the doctrines at issue to be incorrect logically, but are sufficient to raise great doubts as to their merits.
Hume really showed how one lives in a Pyrrhonian universe. None of our naturally acquired beliefs are offered as truths, as knowledge, with which to refute the Pyrrhonist.
They are all irrational, but as Hume pointed, necessary in our existence. We judge because we have to, and we act because we have to. Neither our judgments nor our actions prove that we possess any rational basis for what we do.
What I wish to show, as the philosophical significance of Hume's criticisms of Pyrrhonism, is that it is the only ' consistent ' version of the original sceptical theory, more consistent than even the formulation in Sextus Empiricus. Other Pyrrhonians have been either too sceptical or too dogmatic to hold to the position consistently.
Hume, as I shall try to prove, found the proper mixture of dogmatism and scepticism, of belief and suspense, for a Pyrrhonist.
Hume, for the various reasons presented above, accepted the Pyrrhonian analysis of human knowledge, so long as that analysis was restricted to the theoretical foundations of human knowledge. He contended, however, that the acceptance of such an analysis could not be accompanied by the development of a suspensive attitude towards any and every question because our natural constitution would not permit it. This contention is merely a legitimate extension of the Pyrrhonian principle of living according to nature. The classical Pyrrhonians, as was mentioned earlier, had never held the view as it appears in Hume's remarks, in that the original holders of this view had not advocated total suspense of opinion and action. Sextus had said, 'Adhering, then, to appearances we live in accordance with the normal rules of life, undogmatically, seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive. And it would seem that this regulation of life is fourfold, and that one part of it lies in the guidance of Nature, another in the constraint of the passions, another in the tradition of laws and customs, another in the instruction of the arts. Nature's guidance is that by which we are naturally capable of sensation and thought; constraint of the passions is that whereby hunger drives us to food and thirst to drink; tradition of customs and laws, that whereby we regard piety in the conduct of life as good, but impiety as evil; instruction of the arts, that whereby we are not inactive in such arts as we adopt. But we make all these statements undogmatically .73
In this statement there are two important points which Hume never recognized as part of the Pyrrhonian thesis, and therefore attacked the Pyrrhonians for omitting, first that we cannot remain wholly inactive, and second, 73"extus Empiricus, Outlines, I, sections 23-4. that sensation and thought are natural occurrences and are to be accepted as such. Hume really offered a radical form of the old doctrine by showing what the ancient Pyrrhonians never realised-that almost everything we believe is due to nature's guidance and that our activity commits us to accepting far more than they expected. If we live according to nature, we then suspend judgment only when it is natural to do so, and, as Hume contended, it is not natural to do so solely because we lack rational evidence for coming to a decision. E.g., in discussing the question, 'Does motion exist' ?, Sextus maintained that it was evident to our senses that it does, while our reasoning showed that this was impossible, and therefore we should 'suspend our judgment-in view of the contradiction between appearances and arguments-regarding the question as to the existence or non-existence of motion .74 Hume pointed out that in asking people to suspend judgment on such a question, the Pyrrhonian may be asking them to do something very unnatural. If the Pyrrhonian view consists in showing that there is no basis for any opinion, and that the way in which one does live if this is the case is by the guidance of nature, then the consistent Pyrrhonist, like Hume, will believe in whatever he is naturally compelled to, and will suspend judgment on that which he is compelled to. Nature leads us to this suspensive attitude when the dogmatist's arguments go too far away from the affairs of common life. On the other hand, nature does not lead us to a suspensive attitude on many unfounded beliefs about the common affairs of mankind.75 It is really only on the basis of a psychological investigation that one can determine when, in actual life, we do suspend judgment. This cannot be discovered merely by investigating the grounds for our opinions. The ancient Pyrrhonians, even if they were not guilty of the failure to see the need for some sort of human activity, were guilty of too much dogmatism, in thinking that one should and could suspend judgment on all questions. They were guilty of the same sort of dogmatic rationalism that they were trying so hard to overthrow, in that they thought a conclusion was to be accepted because it followed logically. The proper Pyrrhonian view separates the problems of rational evidence for beliefs, and the psychology of beliefs. One believes for various psychological causes, which often have nothing to do with the evidence at hand. One is sceptical for various psychological causes, also. Hence, the Pyrrhonist ought to hold, as Hume did, that one believes when one must, one doubts when one must, though, on the epistemological level, no opinion of doubt or belief can be justified. And this is following nature's guidance.76 74Ibid., I.[.., sec. 81. 75Sextus admitted this with regard to certain types of non-rational inferences. E.g. the sceptic assents to the fact that smoke signifies fire, though the existence of the fire is not deducible from the occurrence of the smoke, since this is the way we operate. Cf. Ibid., II, sec. 102. On the other hand, Sextus insisted that 'the Pyrrhonian philosopher assents to nothing that is non-evident'.
Ibid., I, Sec. 13. This, as Hume showed, is unnatural, and just stubbornness.
?7This distinction between epistemological scepticism and psychological ability to doubt is different from the classical distinction between theory and practice, since, according to Hume, the Pyrrhonian analysis applies to both theoretical and practical matters, and psychological factors determine our ability to doubt on matters on either level.
Not only were the Pyrrhonians too dogmatic in their scepticism, in insisting on their suspensive attitude on all matters, they are too sceptical in trying to be undogmatic at all times. Sextus insisted that the sceptic never makes any positive assertions, but only asserts what appears to be the case at any time, undogmatically.77 But is this natural ? Hume contended that we are dogmatic at times owing to the various psychological and biological factors operating upon us. ' Nor is it only proper we shou'd in general indulge our inclination in the most elaborate philosophical researches, notwithstanding our sceptical principles, but also that we shou'd yield to that propensity, which inclines us to be positive and certain in particular points, according to the light, in which we survey them in any particular instant. 'Tis easier to forbear all examination and enquiry, than to check ourselves in so natural a propensity, and guard against that assurance, which arises from an exact and full survey of an object. On such an occasion we are apt not only to forget our scepticism, but even our modesty too; and make use of such terms as these, 'tis evident, 'tis certain, 'tis undeniable; which a due deference to the public ought, perhaps, to prevent. I may have fallen into this fault after the example of others; but I here enter a caveat against any objections, which may be offer'd on that head; and declare that such expressions were extorted from me by the present view of the object, and imply no dogmatical spirit, nor conceited idea of my own judgment, which are sentiments that I am sensible can become no body, and a sceptic still less than any other .78
Thus, the sceptic, in stating what seems to him, will be as dogmatic as he feels at that moment, or as sceptical as he feels. This is the natural way. The ancient Pyrrhonian who wanted to be undogmatic at all times, was confusing his desire to be undogmatic on the epistemological level with his natural propensity to state his opinions of the moment in a dogmatic way. The proper Pyrrhonist has no rational basis for his opinions, but still has strong opinions owing to his psychological and biological constitution.
The ancient Pyrrhonians always claimed that their attitude, if accepted, would have therapeutic results. The sceptic would attain a state called 'quietude' by ceasing to dogmatise about anything. 'The man who determines nothing as to what is naturally good or bad neither shuns nor pursues anything eagerly; and, in consequence, he is unperturbed .79 However, if Hume is correct, the orthodox Pyrrhonist will not attain peace of mind, and instead will go mad. Only the Humean Pyrrhonist has any hope for quietude. The former will be continually fighting nature in his unnatural effort to retain a suspensive attitude and to be undogmatic at all times. His passions, propensities, etc., will every moment be leading him to judge and to judge dogmatically, while the Pyrrhonian will, on principle, be trying desperately to resist. Both the Humean and the orthodox Pyrrhonist may be at ease as to the intellectual merits of any dogmatic view, but only the former is able to have a peaceful attitude towards the view, since how he feels about it will be natural, and there will be no attempt to combat his inclinations. To conclude, then, Hume was trying to show the psychological impossibility of accepting a certain version of Pyrrhonism, and in doing so offered the only ' consistent ' formulation of that extreme sceptical view. One does not and cannot suspend judgment merely because of lack of rational basis for any conclusion. Epistemological Pyrrhonism, though the only possible conclusion of philosophical analysis, according to Hume, cannot cause us to adopt a practical Pyrrhonian attitude. This attack can be pushed, beyond the truncated version of Pyrrhonism that Hume attacked, against the original version as well, when the ancient sceptics tried to insist on too dogmatic an attitude on suspending judgment, and too sceptical an attitude towards being dogmatic. Both of these points are in fact determined by nature and not by theory. Hence, if one is really Pyrrhonian, as Hume was, one will be as dogmatic and as opinionated as one is naturally inclined to be.80
Hume's full view of himself as the ' consistent' Pyrrhonist comes out in the picture that he painted of what the true sceptic is like, both in the character of Philo in the Dialogues, and in various remarks in all his philosophical writings. The true Pyrrhonist is both a dogmatist and a sceptic. In being entirely the product of nature he welds his schizophrenic personality and philosophy together. He believes whatever nature leads him to believe, no more and no less. He is compelled to believe, and in accepting the compulsion he is exhibiting his scepticism. He is led to philosophize by certain natural inclinations, and through them to come to certain conclusions, and in so doing he is again exhibiting his scepticism. 'I may, nay I must yield to the current of nature, in submitting to my senses and understanding; and in this blind submission I shew most perfectly my sceptical disposition and principles '.81 Even the more 'mitigated scepticism' which Hume proposed, as an alternative to extreme scepticism, at the end of the Enquiry, comes to no more than this. This sceptic, once thoroughly convinced of the force of the Pyrrhonian doubts, and seeing that it is only the strong power of natural instinct that allows him to go on, will philosophize because he gains pleasure from it, and because he has a propensity to reason.82 Such a sceptical philosopher will restrict his reasonings within the compass of our faculties, and will only be organizing the principles of common life. Philosophy, as a natural pursuit rather than the haughty speculations 80There is, of course, a point at which even Hume's formulation of 'consistent' Pyrrhonism breaks down. Hume requires a theoretical framework in order to distinguish between epistemological Pyrrhonism and one's psychological abilities. Such a framework will constitute a systematic position not open to Pyrrhonian attacks if the distinction between epistemology and psychology which is made within it is any more than a strong natural belief of David Hume. 8sTreatise, p. 269. 'In all the incidents of life we ought still to preserve our scepticism. If we believe, that fire warms, or water refereshes, 'tis only because it costs us too much pains to think otherwise. Nay, if we are philosophers, it ought only to be upon sceptical principles, and from an inclination, which we feel to the employing ourselves after that manner. Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate upon us '. Ibid., p. 270. 82Enquiry, p. 133.
of the dogmatists, whether dogmatic dogmatists or dogmatic sceptics, is not a search for sufficient reasons, but only an extension and clarification of ordinary, natural reasonings.83 Such a sceptic will be modest, diffident, and careless. He will come to some degree of doubt, and will always see the lack of rational basis for any conclusion. He will, sometimes, realise that he reasons in the careless manner of speculating owing to an inclination of the moment, of accepting a conclusion pro ter. because of the way it strikes him, etc. ' The conduct of a man, who studies philosophy in this careless manner, is more truly sceptical than that of one, who feeling in himself an inclination to it, is yet so over-whelm'd with doubts and scruples, as totally to reject it. A true sceptic will be diffident of his philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical conviction; and will never refuse any innocent satisfaction, which offers itself, upon account of either of them '.84
The final portrait of the sceptic, according to Hume, comes out in the very odd footnote in the last of the Dialogues :
'It seems evident, that the dispute between the sceptics and dogmatists is entirely verbal, or at least regards only the degrees of doubt and assurance, which we ought to indulge with regard to all reasoning: And such disputes are commonly at the bottom, verbal, and admit not of any precise determination. No philosophical dogmatist denies, that there are difficulties both with regard to the senses and to all science: and that these difficulties are in a regular, logical method, absolutely insolveable. No sceptic denies, that we lie under an absolute necessity, notwithstanding these difficulties, of thinking, and believing, and reasoning with regard to all kind of subjects, and even of frequently assenting with confidence and security. The only difference, then, between these sects, if they merit that name, is, that the sceptic, from habit, caprice, or inclination, insists most on the difficulties; the dogmatist, for like reasons, on the necessity '86 Who ever heard of such a dogmatist, or such a sceptic ? Certainly no Cartesian, Spinozist, or Leibnizian would accept the fact that there are absolutely insoluble difficulties in our reasonings. Certainly, no sceptic of ancient times ever granted that there is an absolute necessity for believing on all sorts of subjects. The only such dogmatist and sceptic was Hume himself, the complete Pyrrhonist. He alone believed that both the difficulties and the necessity exist. The picture of the two, the dogmatist and sceptic, is a picture of the perfect Pyrrhonist in his two moods, his split personality. In one mood, the difficulties overcome him, in another, the necessities do. Only by being both can one be a philosopher, and live according to nature.86 RICHARD 
